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The Blockchain social movement not only opposed 
the economic system in the post-2009 financial crisis 
years, it provided a tangible technological alternative, 
built in computer code and using Open Source (OS) 
principles.  
The social movement mobilized using familiar OS 
structures and activities as action repertoires. Although 
this openness encouraged mobilization, this ran the risk 
of losing control, as individuals used the OS code for 
their own purposes, outside the scope of the social 
movement.  
The use of OS action repertoires provided ways to 
coordinate, vent and build consensus. Further, the 
resulting dissent, when it occurred made the movement 
more relevant by extending the movement and 
mobilizing individuals in complementary areas, driven 
by economic incentives. The OS repertoire of open 
entrepreneurship also facilitated mobilization, making 
the movement more influential. 
1. Introduction
The emergence of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin 
occurred at a time when the financial system of the day 
was facing a crisis of trust: Existing elites and 
institutions had been criticized for taking advantage of 
ordinary individuals (often called the 99%), in order to 
make money for the 1%, including through bail-outs [1]. 
Crucially, many pointed to a systemic failure in the 
financial system as enabling this problematic behavior, 
namely centralization e.g. [2]. The decentralized Open 
Source (OS) technology behind Bitcoin, the Blockchain, 
was framed as providing a technical alternative “as a 
system for electronic transactions without relying on 
[third party] trust” [3]. In so doing, it 1) offered an OS 
technology as an alternative to existing ways of 
conducting transactions, which 2) allowed for more 
transparency in how and when new money was created, 
and 3) built upon OS repertoires when it came to both 
organizing and governance [4]. This digitally mediated 
form of trust emerged at the same time as other anti-
establishment economic social movements like Occupy 
Wall Street [5], and other digital and decentralized 
alternatives in finance, like crowdfunding [6], [7] and 
peer-to-peer loans [8]. 
Although many activists are skeptical of new 
technologies [9], technologies can be both a tool in a 
social movement, for instance when activists rally 
behind a cancer treatment technology [10], or the 
outcome of activism, as in the case of animal rights 
activism leading to technological alternatives to animal 
testing [11]. That a technology might embody the 
processes through which activism occurs, rather than as 
a tool or an outcome of activism is perhaps not 
surprising, given advances in understanding the 
materiality of the digital in organizing [12], [13].  
Mobilization with the aim of reaching a critical 
mass is a common goal for social movements. In this 
case, for Blockchain technologies to become an 
alternative to this one element of the financial system 
would require not just the technology, but adoption by a 
critical mass. This would frame the technology as a 
viable alternative to the status quo and legitimize the 
cause [14], while also attracting resources that would 
support activism [15]. Activists typically mobilize 
through organizational and protest structures, known as 
action repertoires [16].  
Social movements (SMs), or “networks of informal 
interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups 
and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural 
conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities” 
[17, p. 1] often have a champion who guides the 
movement [18], harnesses and generates knowledge 
[19], and attracts other resources [15]. However, an OS 
movement does not necessarily have a single champion. 
Instead, it relies on openness to attract resources and 
knowledge [20]. However, this approach does not 
prevent resources and knowledge from leaving the 
community or being used for unsanctioned ends [21]. 
This has been highlighted as a paradox: openness 
encourages adoption, use and innovation through re-use 
and repurposing, encouraging an OS project (and thus a 
social movement) to grow. However, this may come at 
the expense of control and the ability to set collective-
level goals [22]. 





That this openness is double-edged makes its 
implications for the social movement unclear. On the 
one hand, individuals in an OS social movement might 
pursue similar goals, albeit in different ways and with 
different incentives. On the other hand, this openness 
may lead to fragmentation. Thus, understanding how OS 
social movement repertoires are employed, and for what 
ends, is critical to understanding how these repertoires 
affect the social movement. We thus ask the question: 
How does the use of open source repertoires to 
mobilize affect the Blockchain social movement? 
This paper builds on literatures around OS 
communities, e.g. [20], [22], [23], social movement 
repertoires [18], [24], and the dynamics around a social 
movement mediated by a technology [10], [11]. More 
specifically, it considers the effect of mobilization 
through OS repertoires on 1) the social movement of 
Blockchain’s core aims, namely to highlight the flaws 
of the existing economic system and present a viable 
alternative, and 2) what happens when a technology 
mediates a social movement.  
To answer this question, we undertook a mixed 
methods study of the social movement, based on forum 
data spanning a 6-year period, triangulated against other 
sources. In what follows, we discuss how OS features 
provide a familiar tactical repertoire, and how they are 
used to mobilize in the name of the Blockchain social 
movement. We then turn to analyzing the case of the 
Blockchain social movement. 
2. The OS social movement of Blockchain
Social movements typically frame a crisis like 
2008/2009 financial crisis the as a political opportunity 
[5], [25]. This particular crisis was characterized as, at 
best, an unfortunate accident in a complex system [26], 
or at worst a failure of market economics [27], in a 
system dominated by elites [2]. At its core, it exposed 
the failings in which the formerly legitimate financial 
system operated. Blockchain proponents argued not just 
that social system had failed, but that there was a 
problem with their material systems, namely the fact 
that they were 1) centralized, and thus 2) controlled by 
elites with vested interests. It then offered an alternative 
in the form of a new technology. 
Extant research has pointed to how digital 
technologies have transformed social movements in one 
of two ways: either by 1) affecting the process of 
activism through the use of digital tools, most notably 
social media, or 2) prompting new technologies, 
increasingly digital, as a result of activism. These two 
areas of research are summarized in Table 1. 
2.1. OS, Digital Technologies and Social 
Movements 
The Blockchain social movement, in a novel turn of 
events, chose to oppose the economic system by not just 
protesting against it as others had done e.g. [28], but by 
providing an (open source) alternative to how the 
economic system might run. In the process it made use 
of a repertoire of familiar narratives and actions to 
promote the technology, with an emphasis on 
mobilization.  
Gathering a mass following and aligning 
individuals with the social movement’s aims is known 
as mobilization. Mobilization is pursued for three 
reasons; first, for the movement’s narratives and actions 
to be perceived as influential and relevant [29], [30], 
second to mobilize resources [31], and third to 
overcome the impasse where there is no individual 
incentive to act (or even incentives for individual 
members of the collective to ‘free ride’[32]), known as 
collective action.  
Table 1: The impact of digital technologies on social movement processes and outcomes 
Description Case Example Reference 
Digital technologies 
present new ways of 
mobilising and 
acting  
New forms of collective engagement during the Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill 
e.g. Vaast et al. 2017
Online activism at 2009 G20 London Summit during the 
global (2009) financial crisis 
e.g. Bennett and Segerberg 2011
Bypassing gatekeepers in the Tahrir Square uprising e.g. Tufekci and Wilson 2012 
Informal learning during #OccupyWallStreet e.g. Gleason 2013
Digital empowerment during protests against a rare earth 
refinery plant  
e.g. Leong et al. 2015
Digital action repertoires at Amnesty International e.g Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016
Technological 
solutions as a result 
of social movements 
Technological alternatives to animal testing e.g. Weisskircher 2019 
Digital Education through MOOCs e.g. Longstaff 2017
Creation of new (technological) knowledge 
e.g. Casas-Cortés, Osterweil, and
Powell 2008 
Democratisation of entrepreneurial finance through 
crowdfunding 
e.g. Gleasure 2015; Ingram 
Bogusz, Teigland, and Vaast 2019
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Supporters of a social movement are more likely to 
mobilize around an issue where there are existing, 
familiar, organizational structures and familiar forms of 
protest, or action repertoires [16]. OS repertoires are 
well-established when it comes to software and 
hardware projects. However, to our knowledge, such a 
project has never formed the basis for a deliberate and 
organized social movement, even if they have indirectly 
shaped societies. Coordinating mechanisms in OS have 
come to be well-recognized and, within their 
communities, legitimate [33]. 
Open source software projects are often described 
not only as the most successful examples of online 
collaboration [41]–[43], but fast collaboration [44] by 
distributed and self-motivated groups [45], [46]. 
Crucially, these efforts are not only open and 
collaborative—but voluntary, implying that economic 
incentives are seldom behind OS collaborations [44], 
[46]. The exception to this is the increased involvement 
of corporate actors in OS projects [47], and the 
emergence of so-called “open entrepreneurs” who 
commercialize additions to OS code or build spin-outs 
[48], [49]. 
Among the most established of these repertoires are 
coordination through developer mailing lists [20], [47] 
forum discussions [50], code sharing [51], and code 
forking [52], [53]. In Table 2, we give descriptions of 
these repertoires in extant literature, describe their aims 
and typical outcomes, and give exemplar references.  
Having presented the theoretical background to our 
study, we turn now to presenting our case and findings. 
Table 2. Summary of extant OS Action Repertoires 
OS Action 
Repertoire 













interest, and often 
active, in a project 
Bug management, record of 
version control, and 
developer issue discussion 
e.g. Lindberg et al., 
2016; Shaikh &




Areas for public 
discussion of an OS 
project. Typically 
includes developers, 
but also users who 
are not developers 
Public discussion 
forum for interaction 
between developers, 
users, and other 
interested actors 
Overlap with developer 
mailing lists, but with 
considerable content from 
non-developers (e.g. user 
issues, requests for advice, 
etc)  
e.g. Dahlander & 
Magnusson, 2008; 
Demil & Lecocq, 
2006; Ingram Bogusz 
& Morisse, 2018 
Code Sharing 
Computer code 
shared, often through 
a public repository 
like GitHub, typically 
with an OS licence in 
place 
To enable the reuse 
of OS code 
OS code is shared and 
reused, both by OS and non-
OS projects (although the 










(but not always) 
through a public 
repository  
To enable the reuse 
and repurposing of 
code in new projects, 
whether with or 
without sanction of 
the original project 
OS code is re-used, creating 
new versions of a project, 
for instance when there is a 
disagreement between 
developers or in the interest 
of a hobby 
e.g. Andersen &
Ingram Bogusz, 
2019; Fleming & 
Waguespack, 2007; 





Addition of new 
features, for instance 
a new work package 
or user interface 
New code modules 




Additions to the OS code, 
typically reliant on either 
the original OS code or a 
forked version. These may 
be free or paid-for additions 
(open entrepreneurship) 




et al., 2015 
3. Case and Research Design
Interest in the Blockchain in recent years has largely 
centered on how fast it has grown in value—from 
around 30 (US) cents per Bitcoin in January 2011, to 
around over 9000 USD in July 2020, with a peak of 
nearly 20 000 USD per bitcoin in late 2017. At the same 
time, the underlying Blockchain technology has been 
appropriated by Organisations and governments to build 
new systems, for instance R3-Corda by banks and 
TradeLens by Maersk and IBM to track shipping supply 
chains. While second and third generations of the 
technology are often centrally controlled, the original 
Bitcoin Blockchain was not.  
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The fact that the original Bitcoin blockchain was 
not centrally controlled is important to understanding 
why it emerged. This decentralized design, and with it a 
correlation between control and interest in the system 
was thought to be a way to protect the users of the 
system [53]. 
In our case, a tension emerged between the original 
intentions of those who built the system, namely, to keep 
it fully decentralized, and the realization that this 
decentralization was ineffective and prevented the 
system from evolving to meet increased use and 
demand.  
4. Data collection and analysis
We collected conversation threads from the Bitcoin 
Discussion section of the online forum bitcointalk.org. 
Bitcointalk.org is a forum dedicated to discussions 
around Bitcoin, primarily in English. It is among the 
most prominent forums used by Blockchain enthusiasts. 
However, unlike mainstream forums like Reddit.com, it 
is often used specifically by Blockchain professionals 
meaning that interactions on Bitcointalk.org are 
particularly linked to the development of the Bitcoin 
community and the underlying Blockchain. 
Furthermore, the Bitcoin Discussion section contains 
threads that are both general and specific in nature; for 
instance, threads around the technicalities of the 
Blockchain and mining as well as discussions of the 
ideological underpinnings of the community.  
The data consists of 314 551 digital trace records 
covering 13 032 conversation threads in the period from 
October 2010 to September 2015. This period was 
selected because it contains at least five salient events in 
which the Blockchain community was forced to 
mobilize including the Harakury fraud incident, the 
hacking and theft from the bitcoin exchange Mt.Gox, 
the introduction of bitcoin as a digital currency, the 
splitting of the community over block size, and the 
introduction of credit, merchant, and sidechain additions 
to the Blockchain infrastructure. 
Our starting point was to treat the forum data as 
representing interests of those using/maintaining 
Bitcoin and underlying infrastructure. We used 
computational methods to cluster the most common 
search terms, which we then coded manually to identify 
key topics of discussion. We triangulated the 
importance of these topics against our own knowledge 
and media archives [63].  
We conducted a qualitative-computational analysis 
of the collected digital trace records of interactions 
among members of the Bitcoin community. Data 
analysis was conducted in three steps: First, we applied 
the term frequency based topic modelling algorithm [61] 
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [62] to generate 
descriptive coding of observed interactions that identify 
the use of OS repertoires in the Blockchain community. 
The second step was to parse these descriptive 
clusters and classify them, identifying distinct 
discussions of OS repertoires in the data, analogous to 
what is done in purely manual coding [53]. The third 
step involved linking the emerging OS repertoires to 
extant theory. These steps, and the methods used, are 
summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3. Overview of Analysis and Methods 
Analytical step Analytical technique Analytical outcome 
1. Initial coding for OS repertoire use
Topic modelling using Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
Identified 45 issues mediated by OS 
repertoires 
2. Axial coding for distinct OS 
repertoire discussion and use
Manual coding of topic clusters 
resulting from the topic model 
Explication of five OS repertoires and 
instantiation of 11 sub-repertoires    
3. Theoretical coding 
Theoretical coding of the data to 
unpack OS repertoire use  
Explanation of the effect of OS 
repertoire use on the social 
movement 
5. Findings
We turn now to unpacking the OS repertoires that we 
see in the Blockchain movement (summarized in Table 
4). Overall, we find that OS repertoires allow not only 
for coordination and shared-problem solving, consistent 
with extant OS research, but also that OS repertoires 
create incentives for individual-level activities that 
advance the goals of the larger movement, particularly 
through mobilization and by mollifying dissent by 
providing a space for ventilation. 
5.1. Developer mailing list and public 
forum discussions 
Public forums provided for the repertoires of consensus-
building and for community members to express their 
frustrations, or what we call ventilation. Consensus-
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building was visible in how community members 
discussed concerns around country-level regulations, as 
well as how to respond to corruption within the 
Blockchain community. Sometimes this consensus-
building was unsuccessful, with the conversations 
ending without consensus, as in the case of how to 
respond to dominant players, for instance miners in 
China:  
It looks grim for BTC without China in the picture 
and you might say we don't need China other countries 
will acknowledge it and there will be mass adoption but 
look at the value of BTC now without China in the 
picture. China obviously is a big player and I can't see 
BTC hitting a new milestone or even hitting the peak of 
$1,300 BTC but I hope I am wrong. What do you think?” 
(December 18, 2013, 10:54:17 AM) 
At the same time, individuals used the space to 
ventilate, without the intention of building consensus, as 
happened during the bankruptcy of a sizeable Bitcoin 
exchange called Mt.Gox: 
“…looks like green adresses are failing , theese 
things are non confirmation adresses , witch should be 
protected by MTGOX.... because the bitcoin network did 
not confrm yet , BITSTAMP does not seem to have this 
problem , NOR does BTC china!so it is NOT a general 
bitcoin problem.but a gox green adress problem.so 
THIS IS A GOX ONLY PROBLEM! , not bitcoin! if it 
was a general btc error Bitstamp would have had the 
same problem and so would have BTC china!” 
(February 10, 2014, 10:50:20 AM) 
5.2. Code Sharing and Debugging 
Delving into the activities performed by developers (in 
consultation with the wider community, our analysis 
pointed to how Code Sharing and Debugging were used 
in practice. This repertoire, drawing on common OS 
practices, saw developers coordinate with one another 
and community members (sub-repertoire developer 
coordination) around code streamlining, maintenance 
and minor improvements. We observed two significant 
instances where this occurred, namely in discussions 
around how efficient Bitcoin was compared to other 
Blockchains, and how to respond to Bitcoin’s perceived 
inefficiencies, particularly difficulties scaling to reach 
rising demand:   
“By default Bitcoin will not created blocks larger 
than 250kb even though it could do so without a hard 
fork. We have now reached this limit. Transactions are 
stacking up in the memory pool and not getting cleared 
fast enough. 
What this means is, you need to take a decision and 
do one of these things: 
• Start your node with the -blockmaxsize flag set
to something higher than 250kb, for example -
blockmaxsize=1023000. This will mean you
create larger blocks that confirm more
transactions. You can also adjust the size of the
area in your blocks that is reserved for free
transactions with the -blockprioritysize flag.
• Change your nodes code to de-prioritize or
ignore transactions you don't care about, for
example, Luke-Jr excludes SatoshiDice
transactions which makes way for other users.
• Do nothing.
If everyone does nothing, then people will start 
having to attach higher and higher fees to get into 
blocks until Bitcoin fees end up being uncompetitive 
with competing services like PayPal.” (March 06, 2013, 
09:44:20 AM) 
Of note is the fact that there is a connection between 
developer coordination and later code-level changes in 
response to that coordination. In other words, there was 
overlap between the repertoire of developer 
coordination and Feature Additions and Code Forking. 
However, while developer coordination allowed 
the movement to advance when it came to maintenance 
issues both code sharing and debugging and hardware 
debugging facilitated improvement in user, rather than 
code, experience, by making sure that existing functions 
worked as they should—and finding and remedying 
errors and incompatibilities where they occurred. 
5.3. Code and Feature Additions 
Code-level changes which did not amount to minor 
instances of streamlining or maintenance done through 
developer coordination instead amounted to Code and 
Feature Additions, or a repertoire through which 
individuals could rely on the underlying movement to 
build something that they could commercialize. There 
were many instances of this through entrepreneurial 
diversification, or what has elsewhere been called open 
entrepreneurship [48], [49]. Some of this diversification 
responded to market concerns from the community, 
while other instances focused on making the 
community, and thus the movement, more relevant for 
outsiders:  
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Forum discussion over 
two or more periods 
without diverging 
Boycotting of Bitcoin XT Apparent consensus 
on how to respond to 
perceived social and 
technical threats 
Response to regulations 
Response to perceived 





terminates after one 
period, never translates 
into concrete code-based 
proposal  
Attitude (and possible 
response to) dominance 
of Chinese miners 
Failure of community 
to agree on response 
to perceived social 
and technical threats 
Attitude (and possible 
response to) Bitcoin 
scams 
Ventilation 
Self-contained hub of 
discussion, without 
consensus or response 
Response to Mt.Gox 
bankruptcy 
Short-term response 







Discussion over two or 
more periods without 
diverging, spans both 
forums and developer 
mailing lists (links to dev 
posts in forum data) 
Comparison with 
alternatives to Bitcoin 
(e.g. Ether) 
Coordination around 
improving on existing 
applications of code, 
in line with social and 
practical 
considerations 
Code Sharing and 
Debugging 
Reference to pieces of 
code in trying to remedy 
errors/bugs 
Shared Code Support from other 
community members 
in keeping the 
technical elements of 





Seeking support for 
hardware problems that 







Realised addition to 
underlying code base, 
separate applications 
visible in discussion and
verified through 
triangulation with other 
sources 
Merchant applications Innovation within 
technology, making 
use of code, that: 











Proposed but unrealised 
addition to underlying 
code (verified through 
triangulation) 
Giving credit 
May lead to code fork 






proposals to change or 
add to existing code after 
community consensus  
4mb block size change Split to the technology 
in the name of 
unresolved ideological 
differences, typically 
leads users to leave 
the original 
movement  




proposals that change 






code that creates new 
communities, and may 
both new and existing 




proposals necessitate a 
new project, with or 
without consensus, 
typically controversial 




“…We would like to hear from the community what 
are the most annoying\frustrating stuff you have with 
Bitcoin and would love to get a solution for ?Feel free 
to talk about any problem, even if it seems unsolvable or 
too abstract (e.g. Bitcoin is not safe enough for the 
average user) Edit:After reading all the replies, I feel 
confident summarizing that the #1 problem of Bitcoin is 
probably lack of adoption. And the main reasons of lack 
of adoption are probably ease of use and insufficient 
security. We are a team of entrepreneurs and software 
developers that are going to spend the next following 
months-year on developing a new product.One of the 
most appealing markets for us is the Bitcoin market.We 
will try to learn us much as possible from your replies 
and try to tackle the problems head on” (June 27, 2015, 
03:19:37 AM) 
Many of these additions were hard to implement as 
they would require changes to the character of the 
community, and systemic changes to the code—not just 
reliance on the existing code, as in the case of a credit 
feature addition:  
“If there's no backstop such as the one which 
central banks provided in 2008, you could potentially 
see a rapid contraction of credit down to zero and 
complete collapse of the entire system as everyone tries 
to exchange their credit for something tangible.” 
(December 28, 2012, 02:34:03 PM) 
These failed attempts at adding features instead led 
to code forking. 
5.4. Code Forking 
It is well-known that participants in OS software 
projects disagree, whether on what to do, or how to do 
it [44]. This is true of the Blockchain social movement 
too. When attempts at developer coordination or 
community consensus-building fails, members of the 
social movement repurpose the existing code in new 
projects [52], [53]. In this case, code forking as a 
repertoire occurs as one of three sub-repertoires.  
First, sub-optimality correction refers to dramatic 
changes to the underlying code ([53]), in the name of 
improving the existing movement. In other words, those 
who engage in sub-optimality correction do so in the 
name of supporting and making the social movement 
more relevant: 
“Sometimes bottleneck happening,too much-
unconfirmed transaction when the blocksize only limited 
for 1mb,and it'll affect on your transaction,need to wait 
longer than usual and sometimes it'd took time about 1 
hour or more,it's sure a problem i guess, i'm sure you 
don't want to wait about ~1hour when your client is 
waiting for the transaction. I can catch up your point 
dude, you are absolutely right that sometimes the 
transaction of bitcoin have been delaying even troubled. 
But i hoe that problem will fix by developers of bitcoin . 
" (May 27, 2016, 11:15:24 AM) 
In contrast, ideological pivots are not about 
improving on the existing movement, but rather making 
the movement relevant by expanding it to new user 
groups. In the process, existing users may leave—or 
remain members of the original project while also 
supporting a new project. Typically, the disagreements 
here are of an ideological character—with practical 
implications. The typical case is that of Bitcoin XT: as 
a result of increased use, the Bitcoin blockchain had 
slowed due to increased demand. One proposed solution 
was to increase the size of each block, from 1mb to 4mb. 
This would reduce the number of miners able to run the 
software (owing to issues around processing power), 
centralizing control of the blockchain, but would 
increase the Blockchain’s transaction handling capacity 
in a new version of the blockchain known as BitcoinXT. 
This centralization was an ideological issue in the 
community as it was described as making the movement 
less democratic, hence the ideological split.  
Lastly, Spin-offs occurred when users or developers 
decided to start a new project for reasons that were 
largely unrelated to the perceived effectiveness of the 
existing blockchain, but rather around its capabilities or 
scope. In other words, they wished to be able to do more 
with the underlying technology than the existing 
movement allowed for. 
Having discussed how OS repertoires manifested in 
the social movement of Blockchain (table 4), we turn 
now to discussing the implications of these findings for 
our understandings of digital social movements, and the 
interplay between OS and a social movement. 
6. Discussion: OS action repertoires
6.1. OS Repertoires for Coordination 
Within both software e.g. [64], [65] and music 
production [24], OS movements have re-shaped 
competition dynamics and business models and made 
products free and accessible online—thus closing digital 
divides across the globe. In this paper, we not only 
highlight that OS repertoires provide familiar 
organizational structures and actions for coordination 
and activity [16], but also unpack how these OS 
repertoires are employed to mobilize in the social 
movement of the Blockchain.  
We thus link the use of Blockchain mobilization 
activities to existing, familiar, OS repertoires. These 
Blockchain-specific uses of OS repertoires allow for 
mobilization in the social movement of Blockchain 
through developer coordination, code sharing and 
debugging, and hardware debugging. Further, OS 
forums are a context in which developers and movement 
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participants can build consensus or just vent, providing 
not only a way to coordinate, but also ways for 
individuals to let off steam without undermining the 
larger movement. 
Where this coordination fails, further OS 
repertoires help to hitch subsequent projects to the 
parent project through sub-optimality correction, 
ideological pivots and spin-offs, collectively referred to 
as part of the Code Forking repertoire.  
Interestingly, the possibility to build upon the 
system through Feature Additions channels individuals 
to scope the system, making it both more relevant and 
more influential. 
6.2. (Open) Entrepreneurship mobilises 
As highlighted earlier, there is a tension between 
the openness of OS projects, which both attracts 
resources and knowledge [20] and drains them [21]. We 
see evidence of this in the social movement of 
Blockchain, albeit with largely positive outcomes, 
largely because the knowledge here is non-severable; 
reuse and repurposing of code need not detract from the 
original project—and users and developers can be 
involved in multiple projects if they so wish. 
While it could have been the case that the activities 
of individual entrepreneurs would undermine the 
original project [22], [66], what we saw instead was that 
the use of OS repertoires allowed for coordination, when 
needed, avenues in which to vent frustration, and 
avenues to productively harness differences of 
(political) opinion, including ideological differences, in 
the form of code.  
Thus, the use of open entrepreneurship serves not 
just the individuals who benefit economically from it, 
but the social movement as a whole. Not only does open 
entrepreneurship support the movement’s pursuit of 
influence and relevance [29], [30], it facilitates the 
inward flow of resources by attracting new users and 
supporters, and even outside capital [31]. Lastly, it 
resolves collective action problems by creating 
economic incentives for action at an individual level that 
support the movement at the collective level [32].  
6.3. Digital Economic Social Movement 
The Blockchain social movement responded to 
perceived weaknesses in existing economic institutions. 
However, they not only offered alternative economic 
views of the world [67], [68], they built an entire 
alternative system in the form of code. 
In so doing, participants relied on existing 
repertoires known from OS projects to coordinate and 
fine-tune the movement. Crucially, these repertoires 
also highlighted how economic incentives in OS 
projects lead to entrepreneurship [48]. In this case, this 
entrepreneurial drive led to feature addition, which kept 
the social movement relevant and even made it more 
appealing to would-be participants. This entrepreneurial 
drive also leads to the creation of new projects through 
ideological pivoting and spin-offs. 
We submit that this harnessing of economic 
incentives within a digital social movement makes 
Blockchain not just a novel digital social movement that 
responds to a perceived economic failure, but rather an 
economic social movement—in which economic 
incentives mobilise and drive the movement itself, 
keeping it relevant, allowing it to scope, and mobilising 
new movement participants.  
7. Conclusion
Overall, we find that the tension between mobilization 
and fragmentation is a driving mechanism that promotes 
mobilization and, with it, relevance and influence, in the 
economic social movement of Blockchain. Specifically, 
this mechanism operates through individual-level 
activities as participants in the social movement of 
Blockchain not only make use of pre-existing OS 
repertoires to coordinate, ventilate and build consensus 
around issues, but that the use of these repertoires helps 
to keep the movement relevant. 
We further find that while the openness of a social 
movement based on OS principles may lead to a lack of 
control, what occurred in this case was that openness 
encouraged open entrepreneurship—mobilizing further 
in the name of the social movement.  
Lastly, the use of entrepreneurship and the implied 
economic incentives that come with it suggest that 
Blockchain is not just a social movement in response to 
the perceived failings of the economic system, but a 
social movement with an economic character of its own, 
making it an economic social movement. 
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